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THE SCHIAVO DECISION: EMOTIONAL, BUT LEGALLY CONTROVERSIAL?  




Although the decision to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from Terri 
Schiavo attracted an enormous amount of international publicity, from a legal 
perspective the decision was unsurprising. This article explores this view by 
comparing the law that governs the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
medical treatment in Florida where the Schiavo decision was made, and the 
equivalent law in Queensland. It concludes that although the legislation is 
expressed in different terms, the same decision would be reached if a case 
similar to Terri Schiavo’s arose in Queensland. Indeed, it is suggested that 
this conclusion is also likely to be reached in other common law jurisdictions. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The life and death of Terri Schiavo attracted international attention.  A 
decision made by a judge in Florida became a matter of interest worldwide at 
the highest levels prompting comments from the President of the United 
States, George W Bush, and the former pope, John Paul II.  Many of those 
who commented on the case expressed outrage and regarded the decision to 
withdraw Terri Schiavo’s treatment to be an act of unlawful killing.   
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Certainly, this case was a tragic one, although the same could be said for any 
case involving a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining medical 
treatment that results in someone’s death.  However, was the decision to 
withdraw Terri Schiavo’s artificial nutrition and hydration a controversial one 
from a legal perspective?  Was the Florida legislation that facilitated the 
withdrawal of that treatment so remarkable?  Could the same decision have 
been lawfully reached in other jurisdictions? 
 
This article seeks to answer these questions by examining the law in two 
jurisdictions on different sides of the world: Florida and Queensland.  Florida 
is the law under which the Schiavo case was decided and Queensland was 
chosen as the jurisdiction that probably has Australia’s most progressive 
legislation on the issue of withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining medical 
treatment.1  This article considers how these decisions are made for adults 
who lack capacity in Florida, and draws on the Schiavo case to illustrate how 
the law operates. It then considers the legislative framework in Queensland 
and examines whether the Schiavo case would have been decided in the 
same way in that jurisdiction.  The article concludes by comparing the law in 
these two jurisdictions, and commenting on whether the Schiavo case is as 
                                            
1 The Queensland Law Reform Commission carried out a detailed investigation of 
guardianship laws during the 1990s.  The Commission reviewed the existing laws and carried 
out an exhaustive consultation process with a wide range of people and groups. Those 
consulted included people who need assistance with decision making, carers of those people, 
peak interest groups, health professionals, relevant government bodies and those holding 
statutory positions.  The legislation that was ultimately enacted in Queensland is based 
largely on the Commission’s recommendations.  The relevant Commission publications are 
Assisted and Substituted Decisions: Decision-making by and for people with a decision-
making disability, Report No 49 (1996); Assisted and Substituted Decisions: Decision-making 
by and for people with a decision-making disability, Draft Report No WP43 (1995); Assisted 
and Substituted Decisions: Decision-making for People Who Need Assistance Because of 
Mental or Intellectual Disability, Discussion Paper No WP38 (1992); and Steering Your Own 
Ship?, Issues Paper No MP1 (1991). 
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remarkable as is suggested by the degree of intense public scrutiny that it 
attracted.   
 
Before reviewing the law in these two jurisdictions, a brief comment about 
terminology is necessary.  Treatment that is needed to sustain or prolong life 
is commonly referred to as ‘life-sustaining medical treatment’.  This sort of 
treatment includes procedures such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation, 
assisted ventilation and artificial nutrition and hydration.  However, different 
terms for this sort of treatment are used in the Florida and Queensland 
statutes.  The Florida statute refers to a ‘life-prolonging procedure’, which it 
defines as: 
 
‘Life-prolonging procedure’ means any medical procedure, treatment, or intervention, 
including artificially provided sustenance and hydration, which sustains, restores, or 
supplants a spontaneous vital function.  The term does not include the administration 
of medication or performance of medical procedure, when such medication or 
procedure is deemed necessary to provide comfort care or to alleviate pain.2 
 
The Queensland legislation uses the term ‘life-sustaining measure’, which it 
also defines:3 
 5A Life-sustaining measure 
                                            
2 Fla. Stat § 765.101(10) (2005).  This section was different in 1998 when the Schiavo case 
first began in that it did not specifically refer to the provision of artificial sustenance and 
hydration as being a life-prolonging procedure.  The section was amended to its present form 
in 1999.   
3 Powers of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) (the ‘PAA’) and Guardianship and Administration Act 
2000 (Qld) (the ‘GAA’) sch 2 s 5A. 
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(1) A ‘life-sustaining measure’ is health care intended to sustain or prolong life and 
that supplants or maintains the operation of vital bodily functions that are 
temporarily or permanently incapable of independent operation. 
 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), each of the following is a ‘life-sustaining 
measure’— 
(a) cardiopulmonary resuscitation; 
(b) assisted ventilation; 
(c) artificial nutrition and hydration. 
 
(3) A blood transfusion is not a ‘life-sustaining measure’. 
 
Despite the difference in terminology, it is clear that both definitions include 
the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration, which was the life-sustaining 
medical treatment withdrawn from Terri Schiavo and being considered in this 
article. 
2 WITHHOLDING AND WITHDRAWING LIFE-PROLONGING PROCEDURES 
IN FLORIDA 
This section of the article examines the law in Florida regarding decisions to 
withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures from an adult who lacks 
capacity to make such a decision.  It will then specifically consider Terri 
Schiavo’s case which concerned withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration 




2.1 THE LAW 
In 1992, the Florida legislature enacted a framework that provided for 
advance decision making about medical treatment.4  The ‘[l]egislative findings 
and intent’5 set out at the beginning of the relevant chapter make clear that 
the wishes of the adult, if they can be ascertained, are paramount:  
 
The Legislature finds that every competent adult has the fundamental right of self-
determination regarding decisions pertaining to his or her own health, including the 
right to choose or refuse medical treatment. This right is subject to certain interests of 
society, such as the protection of human life and the preservation of ethical standards 
in the medical profession.6 
 
2.1.1 Who decides? 
Under Florida law, an adult can make the decision as to whether to accept or 
refuse a life-prolonging procedure in the future through a type of ‘advance 
directive’ called a ‘living will’.  The statute defines an ‘advance directive’ to 
mean:7 
… a witnessed written document or oral statement in which instructions are given by 
a principal or in which the principal's desires are expressed concerning any aspect of 
                                            
4 Now contained in the 2005 Florida Statutes, ie. Fla. Stat. § 765.101-546 (2005).  To the 
extent that they are relevant to this article, any amendments that have been made to the 
legislation since enactment will be noted. 
5 Fla. Stat § 765.102 (1) (2005). 
6 Ibid.  This reflects the common law as set out in In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 
4, 9 (Fla. 1990). (This case is also sometimes known as State v Herbert.)  In that case, the 
Florida Supreme Court upheld Browning’s right to make choices pertaining to her health, even 
after she had lost capacity.  It held that everyone has the right to sole control of his or her 
person and accordingly, Browning had the fundamental right to self-determination, often 
referred to as a ‘right to privacy’.  In Florida, the right to privacy is expressly set out in article 
1, section 23 of the Florida Constitution.  This can be contrasted with the United States 
Constitution, where the right to privacy is not express, but rather has been held at common 
law to be an implied right: Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965). 
7 Fla. Stat § 765.101(1) (2005).  The definition of advance directive also includes an 
anatomical gift made pursuant to part X of chapter 732 of the statute. 
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the principal's health care, and includes, but is not limited to, the designation of a 
health care surrogate, a living will … 
 
A ‘living will’ (or ‘declaration’) is then defined as meaning:8 
 
(a) A witnessed document in writing, voluntarily executed by the principal in 
accordance with s.765.302; or  
(b) A witnessed oral statement made by the principal expressing the principal's 
instructions concerning life-prolonging procedures.  
 
Alternatively the adult can specifically appoint another person, through a type 
of advance directive known as a ‘health care surrogate designation’, to be a  
‘surrogate’, that is, someone who is authorised to make health care decisions 
in the event that the adult loses capacity.9  The adult can also include specific 
instructions about life-prolonging procedures in this document. 
 
If an adult has not completed a living will setting out his or her wishes and has 
not completed a health care surrogate designation, the legislation then 
entrusts decision making to a ‘proxy’.10  A proxy is the first in the following list 
who is readily available, competent and willing to act:11 
 
• A judicially appointed guardian or guardian advocate; 
                                            
8 Fla. Stat § 765.101(11) (2005).   
9 ‘Surrogate’ is defined as ‘any competent adult expressly designated by a principal to make 
health care decisions on behalf of the principal upon the principal's incapacity’: Fla. Stat § 
765.101(16) (2005).  ‘Incapacity’ or ‘incompetent’ means that the patient is physically or 
mentally unable to communicate a wilful and knowing health care decision: Fla. Stat 
765.101(8) (2005).  A determination of capacity is made in accordance with Fla. Stat § 
765.204 (2005). 
10 Fla. Stat § 765.401 (2005). 
11 Fla. Stat § 765.401(1) (a) – (h) (2005). 
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• A spouse; 
• An adult child;  
• A parent; 
• An adult sibling (or a majority of them who are reasonably available for 
consultation if there is more than one); 
• An adult relative who has exhibited special care and concern for the 
adult, has maintained regular contact and is familiar with the adult’s 
activities, health, and religious or moral beliefs; 
• A close friend; or 
• An appropriately licensed or qualified clinical social worker. 
 
Finally, there is also another potential decision making mechanism in cases 
where there is no advance directive, where the adult is in a persistent 
vegetative state12 and there are no family or friends who are available or 
willing to act as a proxy.13  In such a case, a judicially appointed guardian and 
the adult’s attending physician, in consultation with a medical ethics 
committee, is entitled to decide to withdraw or withhold life-prolonging 
procedures.14 
  
                                            
12 The authors are aware of the terminology that is increasingly preferred to describe such 
patients: ‘post-coma unresponsiveness’. See National Health and Medical Research Council, 
Post-Coma Unresponsiveness (Vegetative State): A Clinical Framework for Diagnosis: An 
Information Paper (2003) [v-vi] <http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/publications/_files/hpr23.pdf> at 19 
October 2005.  However, for the purposes of this article, the terminology used in the 
legislation in both Florida and Queensland will be used: ‘persistent vegetative state’. 
13 Fla. Stat § 765.404 (2005). 
14 Fla. Stat § 765.404(2) (2005). 
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2.1.2 Criteria for decision making 
The conditions that must be satisfied before a life-prolonging procedure can 
be withheld or withdrawn depend upon who the decision maker is. 
 
• Decision made by adult 
If the adult completed a living will that stated that he or she did not want to 
receive a life-prolonging procedure, then that direction must be followed if 
certain conditions are met.15 The first condition is that the adult must not have 
a reasonable medical probability of recovering capacity.16 He or she must also 
be suffering from either a ‘terminal condition’, an ‘end-stage condition’ or be in 
a ‘persistent vegetative state’.17 The assessment of the treating physician that 
the patient is in one of these conditions must also be confirmed by a second 
physician.18  Finally, any limitations expressed orally or in a written declaration 
must have been considered and satisfied.19  Where there is a dispute about 
the expressed view of the adult, a health care provider must initially refrain 
from withdrawing treatment, and allow family members to seek a legal 
review.20 
                                            
15 Fla. Stat § 765.304(1) (2005). 
16 Fla. Stat § 765.304(2)(a) (2005). 
17 Fla. Stat § 765.304(2)(b) (2005).  Each of these three terms is defined in the legislation:  
• ‘terminal condition’ means ‘a condition caused by injury, disease, or illness from 
which there is no reasonable medical probability of recovery and which, without 
treatment, can be expected to cause death: § 765.304(17); 
• ‘end-stage condition’ means ‘an irreversible condition that is caused by injury, 
disease, or illness which has resulted in progressively severe and permanent 
deterioration, and which, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, treatment of 
the condition would be ineffective’: § 765.101(4); 
• ‘persistent vegetative state’ means ‘a permanent and irreversible condition of 
unconsciousness in which there is: 
(a) The absence of voluntary action or cognitive behaviour of any kind; and 
(b) An inability to communicate or interact purposefully with the environment’: § 
765.101(12). 
18 Fla. Stat § 765.306 (2005). 
19 Fla. Stat § 765.304(2)(c) (2005). 
20 Fla. Stat § 765.304(1) (2005). 
 9
 
• Decision made by surrogate 
In deciding whether to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging procedures, a 
health care surrogate must first attempt to apply what is commonly referred to 
as the ‘substituted judgment test’.  This is a subjective test and requires the 
surrogate to make a decision based on what he or she believes that the adult 
would have wanted had he or she been competent.21  This test derives from 
the adult’s constitutional right to privacy, in that if he or she had capacity and 
wanted treatment withdrawn, then his or her wishes would be carried out.22     
 
If the surrogate has nothing to indicate what the adult would have wanted, he 
or she must then make a decision based on the ‘best interests’ test.23  In 
contrast to the substituted judgment test, best interests is an objective test 
and seeks to ascertain what is the best decision that can be made for the 
adult, in all the circumstances.24  
 
There is, however, a range of limits on a surrogate’s decision making power.  
As was the case for living wills, the adult must not have a reasonable medical 
                                            
21 Fla. Stat § 765.205(1)(b) (2005). 
22 In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 9 (Fla. 1990). 
23 Fla. Stat § 765.205(1)(b) (2005). 
24 For a discussion of the best interests test, see John A. Robertson, ‘Cruzan and the 
constitutional status of non treatment decisions for incompetent patients’ (1991) 25 Georgia 
Law Review 1139. The Supreme Court of Washington in Re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 
445 (1987) indicated that the following non exclusive list of factors was relevant in making this 
determination: evidence about the patient's present level of physical, sensory, emotional, and 
cognitive functioning; the degree of physical pain resulting from the medical condition, 
treatment, and termination of the treatment, respectively; the degree of humiliation, 
dependence, and loss of dignity probably resulting from the condition and treatment; the  life 
expectancy and prognosis for recovery with and without treatment; the various options; and 
the risks, side effects, and benefits of each of those options.  
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probability of recovering capacity,25 and must also have either an end-stage 
condition, a terminal illness, or be in a persistent vegetative state.26 Again, the 
requirement of independent certification of the adult’s medical condition 
applies.27 
 
There are also two additional constraints on a surrogate’s decision making 
power that do not apply to living wills.  The first is that the adult patient has not 
excluded the health care surrogate from making decisions to withhold or 
withdraw life-prolonging procedures, as it is possible to appoint a surrogate 
without such power.28  The second is where the adult is pregnant and the 
foetus has not yet reached viability, as a decision to withhold or withdraw life-
prolonging procedures requires the adult (or the court) to have given that 
authority expressly.29 
 
• Decision made by proxy 
Where the adult had not completed a health care surrogate designation, 
decisions on their behalf can be made by a proxy. Again, the proxy must first 
apply the substituted judgment test,30 and then fall back on the best interests 
                                            
25 Fla. Stat § 765.305(2)(a) (2005). This reflects the common law as set out in In re 
Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 9 (Fla. 1990). 
26 Fla. Stat § 765.305(2)(b) (2005).  
27 Fla. Stat § 765.306 (2005). 
28 Fla. Stat § 765.305(1) (2005).   
29 Fla. Stat § 765.113(2) (2005). ‘Viability’ means that stage of foetal development when the 
life of the unborn child may with a reasonable degree of medical probability be continued 
indefinitely outside the womb. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, the woman's 
life and health shall constitute an overriding and superior consideration to the concern for the 
life and health of the foetus when such concerns are in conflict: Fla. Stat § 390.0111(4) 
(2005). 
30 Fla. Stat. § 765.401(2) (2005).  The legislation reflects the common law position as set out 
in In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1990).  
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test in those cases where the wishes of the adult cannot be ascertained.31  
The law for proxies differs from that which governs health care surrogates, 
however, because stronger evidence is required before a decision to withhold 
or withdraw life-prolonging procedures can be made.  A proxy’s decision must 
be supported by ‘clear and convincing evidence’ that the decision is what the 
adult would have chosen.  If there is nothing to indicate what the adult’s 
wishes would have been, the proxy must make a decision which accords with 
the adult’s best interests.32  If there is any ambiguity, the court must presume 
that the adult would have chosen ‘to defend life in exercising his or her right to 
privacy.’33  
As was the case for health care surrogates and decisions made under living 
wills, the adult must also not have a reasonable medical probability of 
recovering capacity, and there must be independent medical certification34 
that he or she has an end-stage condition, is in a persistent vegetative state, 
or has a terminal illness.35  Similarly, court authorisation is required if the adult 
is pregnant and the foetus has not yet reached viability.36 
• Judicially appointed guardian and others 
                                            
31 § 765.401(2) (2005). At the time of the initial application to withdraw the artificial nutrition 
and hydration by Michael Schiavo, this section did not provide for a best interests test. 
Instead § 765.401(2) (1998) said: ‘Any health care decision made under this part must be 
based on the proxy’s informed consent and on the decision the proxy reasonably believes the 
patient would have made in the circumstances.’ The law at that time is set out in Richard L 
Pearse Jr, Report of Guardian Ad Litem, 29 December 1998, 10  
<http://www.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/122998%20Schiavo%20Richard%20Pearse%20GAL%
20report.pdf> at 19 October 2005. The provision was amended on 1 July 2001 to include a 
best interests test. 
32 Fla. Stat § 765.401(3) (2005).  
33 Schindler v Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) quoting In re Guardianship of 
Browning 543 So. 2d 258, 273 (Fla 2d DCA 1989). 
34 Fla. Stat § 765.306 (2005). 
35 Fla. Stat § 765.305 (2005).  
36 Fla. Stat § 765.113(2) (2005). 
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In limited circumstances, a judicially appointed guardian and the adult’s 
attending physician, in consultation with a medical ethics committee, may 
decide to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment.37 Those 
circumstances are: 
 
• The adult is in a persistent vegetative state (as determined by currently 
accepted medical standards);38 
• The adult’s condition is permanent and there is no reasonable medical 
probability for recovery;39 
• The adult does not have an advance directive and there is no evidence 
of his or her wishes;40 
• A reasonably diligent inquiry reveals no family or friends who are willing 
and able to act as a proxy;41 and 
• Such a course of action is in the adult’s best interests.42 
 
2.1.3 Appeal avenues 
An adult's family, the health care facility, the attending physician, or any other 
interested person who is directly affected by a decision to withhold or 
withdraw life-prolonging procedures can seek an expedited judicial review of a 
decision.43  The grounds upon which review can be sought include:44 
                                            
37 Fla. Stat § 765.404(2) (2005). 
38 Fla. Stat § 765.404 (2005). 
39 Fla. Stat § 765.404(2) (2005). 
40 Fla. Stat § 765.404 (2005). 
41 Ibid. 
42 Fla. Stat § 765.404(2) (2005). 
43 Fla. Stat § 765.105 (2005). 
44 Ibid. 
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• The decision is not in accord with the adult’s known wishes or the 
provisions of the legislation; 
• The surrogate or proxy was improperly designated or appointed, has 
failed to discharge duties, is unable to discharge duties due to 
incapacity or illness, or has abused his or her powers; and 
• The adult now has sufficient capacity to make his or her own health 
care decisions. 
In addition, a person who objects to such a decision being made is entitled to 
have recourse to the usual appellate avenues.45 
2.2 THE SCHIAVO CASE 
The Schiavo case was complex and involved interfamilial disputes and 
multiple court hearings.  It also led to an amendment of the statute that 
governed withholding and withdrawing life-prolonging procedures, as well as 
the enactment of a statute specifically designed to overturn a court decision 
allowing Terri Schiavo’s artificial nutrition and hydration to be withdrawn.  The 
case also resulted in constitutional challenges to these enactments.  It is 
beyond the scope of this article to review all of the legal nuances that arose in 
the history of this litigation.  Instead, the background facts as found to exist in 
judicial proceedings will be outlined, as well as the relevant Florida law and 
how it was ultimately applied in the Schiavo context.  Where relevant, the 
matters that were in dispute between Terri’s husband and her parents and 
how those disputes were resolved will be considered.  Finally, there will be a 
                                            
45 In Schiavo itself, for example, Terri Schiavo’s parents appealed against the initial decision 
of the Guardianship Court to both Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal and the Florida 
Supreme Court.  These appeals are discussed in more detail later in the article. 
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brief consideration of the nature and impact of the legislative intervention that 
occurred in this dispute. 
 
2.2.1 Background 
On 25 February 1990, Terri Schiavo, aged 27, suffered a cardiac arrest as a 
result of a potassium imbalance and, although resuscitated by paramedics, 
lapsed into a comatose state.  She eventually emerged from the coma, 
however, she never regained consciousness.  Terri suffered anoxia (loss of 
oxygen to the brain) which resulted in severe brain damage.  A PEG tube was 
inserted to administer artificial nutrition and hydration, as Terri lacked the 
capacity to swallow on her own.   
 
Terri was married to Michael Schiavo at the time of the incident.  On 18 June 
1990, Michael Schiavo successfully applied to be appointed as his 
incapacitated wife’s legal guardian to administer her affairs, and her parents, 
Mr and Mrs Schindler, did not object.46  Until early in 1993, Michael and Mr 
and Mrs Schindler largely agreed on the course of treatment being provided to 
Terri.  From this time onwards, however, the parties were in dispute to a 
significant degree in a range of issues regarding Terri’s care.  Firstly, there 
was disagreement about who should be responsible for making decisions 
about Terri’s health care.  Secondly, the parties were in conflict about the 
treatment that Terri would have wanted had she been able to make the 
decision.  Thirdly, the parties’ views were polarised as to whether Terri was in 
                                            
46 In July 1993, however, the Schindlers made an unsuccessful application to the 
Guardianship Court to remove Michael Schiavo as Terri’s legal guardian.   
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a persistent vegetative state.  The final and pivotal issue was whether Terri’s 
artificial hydration and nutrition should be withdrawn. 
 
2.2.2 Who decides? 
Terri Schiavo had not prepared a living will or a health care surrogate 
designation. Under the Florida legislation, Terri’s husband, as her judicially 
appointed guardian, was recognized as her proxy.47  This enabled him to 
make health care decisions on Terri’s behalf.   
   
Although Michael Schiavo had power, as his wife’s legal guardian, to consent 
to such withdrawal, he placed the decision in the hands of the Guardianship 
Court due to the high level of conflict between himself and his wife’s parents 
about the decision.48  In May 1998, he applied to the Guardianship Court as 
Terri’s legal guardian, seeking an order to terminate life-prolonging 
procedures by withdrawing her artificial nutrition and hydration. 
 
2.2.3 Criteria for decision making 
To succeed in his application to withdraw Terri’s artificial nutrition and 
hydration, Michael Schiavo had to satisfy three conditions.   The first was that, 
applying the substituted judgment test, there was clear and convincing 
evidence that Terri would have wanted the treatment to be withdrawn.49 The 
                                            
47 Had he not been her legal guardian, he would also have been first in line to be proxy, as 
Terri’s spouse: Fla. Stat § 765.401(1) (2000) now Fla. Stat § 765.401(1) (2005). 
48 In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d. 176 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2001).   
49 Fla. Stat § 765.401(3) (2000). 
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best interests test was not part of the applicable Florida law at the time the 
case was heard.50 
 
To determine whether there was clear and convincing evidence, the court 
examined the reliability of claims that Terri had made oral statements about 
her wishes.  The court heard evidence from Michael Schiavo, his brother,  his 
sister-in-law and the Schindlers as to what Terri’s wishes would have been.  
Michael Schiavo asserted that prior to her cardiac arrest, Terri had on several 
occasions expressed the view that she would not want to be kept alive in such 
circumstances.51  As the only evidence before the court was oral expressions 
by Terri of her wishes, the court stated that the accuracy and reliability of this 
oral evidence could be challenged.52  The Schindlers attempted to challenge 
these assertions, however, the court remained satisfied that Terri Schiavo had 
made ‘reliable oral declarations’ which were consistent with the action that her 
guardian, Michael Schiavo, wanted to take.53  This was sufficient to constitute 
‘clear and convincing evidence’ of Terri’s wishes. 
                                            
50 Initially, when the application was filed there was no reference to ‘best interests’ in the 
legislation. An amendment was made in 2000 to Fla. Stat § 765.404 (2000) so that the best 
interests test was relevant for discontinuing life-prolonging procedures. However, this test 
only applied in cases where there was a person in a persistent vegetative state who had no 
friend or family member to be appointed as proxy.  The current best interests test was 
included in 1 July 2001: Fla. Stat § 765.401(3) (2001). 
51 Michael Schiavo and his brother and sister-in-law gave evidence as to oral statements Terri 
Schiavo had made while she was still alive, to the effect that she would not want to be kept 
alive by artificial life support and would not want to be a burden on anyone. 
52 In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d. 176 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2001). 
53 It is interesting to note that the court had previously appointed Richard Pearse, a lawyer, as 
guardian ad litem to review the request to withdraw treatment.  Pearse was not satisfied that 
the evidence as to oral statements Terri had made before her cardiac arrest were clear and 
convincing. Further, his report suggested that Michael Schiavo’s change of heart in relation to 
his wife’s medical treatment occurred only after he received litigation settlement monies.  The 
report recommended that Michael’s application to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration be 
denied and that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent Terri Schiavo’s interests in any 
future proceedings: Richard L. Pearse Jr, above n 31. However, the Court dismissed the 
guardian ad litem’s report on the basis that Pearse held personal views on the withdrawal of 
life-prolonging procedures that had not been disclosed to the court at the time of his 
appointment.   
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The second and third conditions were that Terri must not have had a 
reasonable medical probability of recovering capacity, and that she was in a 
persistent vegetative state.54  In this case, the Court was satisfied that that 
Terri was in a persistent vegetative state and so accordingly, on 11 February 
2000, Judge Greer of the Guardianship Court made an order for the 
withdrawal of Terri Schiavo’s PEG tube. 
 
2.2.4 Legislative intervention 
One of the notable features of the Schiavo case was the extent of judicial 
review sought by the Schindlers.55  Judge Greer first ordered the withdrawal 
of the PEG tube on 11 February 2000.  However, the numerous appeals, 
stays and reviews that were instituted, effectively postponed Terri Schiavo’s 
death for more than five years. 
 
Some of this litigation was prompted by intervention in the Schiavo case by 
the legislature.  On 21 October 2003, shortly after one of the times when Terri 
Schiavo’s PEG tube was withdrawn, the Florida State legislature intervened 
by passing the Starvation and Dehydration of Persons with Disabilities 
Prevention Act. This legislation declared that the Governor of Florida could 
issue a one-time stay of the court order removing the PEG tube.  It also 
authorised the Governor to appoint a guardian ad litem to review the matter 
                                            
54 Fla. Stat § 765.305 (2000).  
55 The details of the many legal proceedings which ensued have been comprehensively 
covered in other writings: see for example, O Carter Snead, ‘Dynamic Complementarity: 
Terri’s Law and Separation of Powers Principles in the End-of-Life Context’ (2005) Florida 
Law Review 53 and Danuta Mendelson and Michael Ashby, ‘The medical provision of 
hydration and nutrition: Two very different outcomes in Victoria and Florida’ (2004) 11 Journal 
of Law and Medicine 282. 
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and report back to both the executive and the chief judge of the relevant 
Florida court.56 
 
Accordingly, Governor Jeb Bush issued an executive order on 21 October 
2003 that Terri’s health care provider reinstate her PEG tube.57  This 
legislation, known as ‘Terri’s Law’, was overturned on 23 September 2004 by 
the Florida Supreme Court on the basis that it was unconstitutional.58  The 
Court held that it was a violation of the separation of powers as the legislature 
had encroached on the judicial decision making function of the courts.59  
Further, the Act had delegated legislative power to the Governor, being a 
member of the Executive.60  The court also held that the legislation purported 
to apply to a limited class of people, in effect, only to Terri Schiavo, which was 
also unconstitutional.61 
 
After the PEG tube was again withdrawn on 18 March 2005, the dispute 
moved into the legislative realm for a second time, with the United States 
Congress also seeking to intervene. It passed legislation purporting to divest 
                                            
56 The law authorised the Governor to issue a one-time stay to prevent the withholding of 
artificial nutrition and hydration from a patient if, as of October 15, 2003: (a) the patient has no 
written advance directive, (b) the court has found that patient to be in a persistent vegetative 
state; (c) that patient has had nutrition and hydration withheld; and (d) a member of that 
patient’s family has challenged the withholding of nutrition and hydration.  Under the law, the 
Governor could lift the stay at any time.  The Act included a sunset provision, providing it 
would expire fifteen days from the date of its enactment.  See the discussion in O Carter 
Snead, above n 55. 
57 Florida, 105th Regular Session; Executive Order 201 (2003 FL EO 201), which directed 
those caring for Terri to immediately provide nutrition and hydration to her by means of 
gastronomy tube, or by any other method determined appropriate. 
58 Bush v Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004). 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid. 
61 This is a breach of the requirement of formal legality under the rule of law, in particular, 
‘generality’ which requires that laws must be addressed to classes or groups of people, not to 
a particular person or specific occasion as was the case with ‘Terri’s Law’.  For a discussion 
of formal legality, see Bottomley and Parker, Law in Context (2nd ed. 1997) Federation Press, 
49. 
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certain Federal Courts with jurisdiction over the issues in the Schiavo case.62  
This Act was again held to be unconstitutional by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit as a breach of the separation of powers.  The 
court held that the legislature was encroaching on the role of the judiciary, as 
each branch of government (the executive, the legislature and the judiciary) 
should be independent of the others.63  The Schindlers were then unable to 
pursue their case further in the Federal Courts. 
 
2.2.5 Terri’s death 
Terri Schiavo finally died on 31 March 2005.  Judge Greer of the 
Guardianship Court subsequently ordered that Michael Schiavo administer his 
wife’s estate.  A post mortem was conducted and the autopsy report 
concluded that although Terri’s condition was ‘consistent’ with her being in 
persistent vegetative state, a post mortem examination cannot prove or 
disprove such a diagnosis because that can only be ascertained through a 
clinical examination of a living patient.64  The report did conclude, however, 
that Terri Schiavo had ‘suffered a severe anoxic brain injury’ and that her 
brain weight was approximately half of what would be expected.65  
 
                                            
62 Pub. L. 109-3. 
63 Schiavo v Schiavo, No 05-11628, (11th Cir. 2005). 
64 Jon R Thogmartin, Report of Autopsy: Theresa Schiavo, 13 June 2005 [8] 
<http://www.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/061505-autopsy.pdf> at 19 October 2005. 
65 Ibid [8]-[9]. 
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3 WITHHOLDING AND WITHDRAWING LIFE-SUSTAINING MEASURES IN 
QUEENSLAND 
Having outlined the legal framework that exists in Florida, and how the 
Schiavo case was decided within that framework, this section of the article 
considers the equivalent issues in the Queensland context. 
 
3.1 THE LAW66 
In Queensland, both the common law and legislation may be relevant when 
decisions are made about withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining 
measures from adults who lack capacity to make such a decision for 
themselves.  The two pieces of legislation that apply in this area, the Powers 
of Attorney Act 1998 (Qld) (the ‘PAA’) and the Guardianship and 
Administration Act 2000 (Qld) (the ‘GAA’), create a legal framework for this 
kind of decision making.  However, these statutes expressly state that the 
inherent jurisdiction of the Queensland Supreme Court is not affected by their 
enactment.67 
 
This means that if guidance or a determination is needed regarding a decision 
to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures, a person has two options.  
Firstly, he or she may pursue the matter through the Guardianship and 
Administration Tribunal (the ‘Tribunal’) which is established by the GAA.68  
Alternatively, a person may seek resolution of the matter from the Supreme 
                                            
66  For a detailed discussion of the Queensland law in relation to withholding and withdrawing 
life-sustaining measures, see Ben White and Lindy Willmott Rethinking Life-Sustaining 
Measures: Questions for Queensland (2005) 
<http://www.law.qut.edu.au/research/lifesustain/> at 19 October 2005. 
67 PAA s 109, GAA s 240. 
68 GAA s 81. 
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Court relying on its inherent jurisdiction and, in particular, its parens patriae 
jurisdiction.  To date, only the Tribunal has considered applications about the 
withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining measures from adults, so this 
article will focus on this aspect of the Queensland law. 
 
As was the case under Florida law, there are two matters that must be 
considered before such a decision can be made:  
• who can make a decision to withhold or withdraw this treatment; and 
• the criteria that must be considered in making the decision.  
 
3.1.1 Who decides? 
If an adult lacks the capacity needed to make a decision about whether to 
withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining measure, then some other decision 
making mechanism is required.  The legislation regards this kind of decision 
as being one about ‘health care’,69 and sets out a list of potential decision 
making mechanisms.70  The decision making mechanism that operates will be 
the first of following that applies to a particular fact situation. 
 
The first is an advance health directive completed by the adult.  The PAA 
facilitates an adult giving a direction in an advanced health directive about 
particular treatment that the adult does not wish to receive at a later date 
                                            
69 PAA and GAA sch 2 s 5(2).  Pursuant to that provision, ‘health care’, of an adult, includes 
withholding or withdrawal of a life-sustaining measure for the adult if the commencement or 
continuation of the measure for the adult would be inconsistent with good medical practice. 
70 GAA s 66. 
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when the adult is no longer able to decide for him- or herself.71  Such a 
directive may include instructions to refuse a life-sustaining measure.72 
 
The second potential decision making mechanism is a guardian appointed by 
the Tribunal to make a decision,73 or an order of the Tribunal itself.74 
 
The third potential decision making mechanism is an attorney appointed 
under an enduring power of attorney75 or under an advance health directive.76 
 
The fourth and final mechanism, if none of the previous ones apply, is that the 
decision is made by a ‘statutory health attorney’. This is another term that is 
defined in the PAA77 and again a priority list is used with the statutory health 
attorney being the first person in the list who is ‘readily available and culturally 
appropriate’ to make the decision: 
 
                                            
71 PAA pt 3.  Note that ‘advance health directive’ as used in the PAA and GAA is a reference 
to a directive completed in accordance with the formal requirements of the PAA.  It does not 
include a reference to a common law advance directive.  See further in this regard Ben White 
and Lindy Willmott, ‘Will You Do As I Ask? Recognition of Instructions about Health Care 
under Queensland’s Legislative Regime’ (2004) 4 Queensland University of Technology Law 
and Justice Journal 77. 
72 PAA s35(2)(b). 
73 The Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to appoint a guardian to make decisions about 
‘personal’ matters on behalf of the adult: GAA s 12.  Such decisions include decisions about 
‘health care’.  ‘Health care’ includes a decision to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining 
measure: see above n 69. 
74 Since its inception, the Tribunal has been involved in a number of decisions regarding the 
withholding and withdrawing of life-sustaining measures including Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13, 
Re TM [2002] QGAAT 1 and Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 2.  
75 The PAA empowers an adult to appoint an attorney to make decisions about personal 
matters (which includes health matters) should the adult later lose his or her capacity to make 
the decision: PAA s 32.   
76 An adult can appoint an attorney under an advance health directive to make decisions 
about health matters: PAA s 35(1)(c).   
77 PAA s 63. 
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• The first possible statutory health attorney is the spouse of the adult, 
provided that the relationship is close and continuing. It is important to 
note that ‘spouse’ will include de facto partners (both heterosexual and 
same sex partnerships).78 
 
• If such a spouse is not available, the next potential statutory health 
attorney is the adult’s carer, provided that the carer is eighteen years of 
age or over and is not a paid carer of the adult. The definition of a ‘paid 
carer’ is important because it specifically excludes those who receive a 
State or Commonwealth carer payment or other similar benefit, or who are 
funded from compensation awarded due to the adult with impaired 
capacity being injured through negligence.79 Accordingly, a person 
providing care in those circumstances is not regarded as a paid carer and 
so is still eligible to be the adult’s statutory health attorney. 
 
• If the adult does not have a carer, the third option is a close friend80 or 
relation81 of the adult who, again, must be eighteen or over and must also 
not be a paid carer.  If more than one person falls within this description, 
then any one of them may make the decision. 
 
                                            
78 Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) s 32DA. 
79 PAA sch 3, GAA sch 4. 
80 A ‘close friend’ of a person, means ‘another person who has a close personal relationship 
with the first person and a personal interest in the first person’s welfare’: PAA sch 3, GAA sch 
4. 
81 A ‘relation’ is defined quite widely and includes, for example, a spouse, a person related by 
blood, marriage, adoption or other relationships, a dependant, or a member of the same 
household: PAA sch 3. 
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• A final option, if an adult has none of these other people available, is that 
the Adult Guardian will act as the statutory health attorney. The Adult 
Guardian is a position established by the statutory regime,82 and that 
person is charged with the responsibility of protecting the rights and 
interests of adults with impaired capacity.83 The rationale in making the 
Adult Guardian a decision maker of last resort is that there will always be 
someone who can make this decision for an adult who lacks capacity. 
 
The legislation is clear in setting out how or from whom consent is to be 
obtained. As has been discussed, it sets out a hierarchy of decision making 
mechanisms and, for the last of these mechanisms, the statutory health 
attorney, it sets out a further prioritised list of people who are empowered to 
act in this role. However, despite this comprehensive approach, problems can 
arise. 
 
A classic situation is where there are two or more eligible statutory health 
attorneys who disagree about how an adult should be treated. This might 
occur, for example, if there is more than one ‘relation’ who would qualify as a 
statutory health attorney for the adult. In a situation such as this, the Adult 
Guardian may become involved, first through mediation.84 If attempts made to 
resolve the dispute in this way are unsuccessful, the Adult Guardian is 
empowered to make the decision on behalf of the adult.85 Intervention by the 
                                            
82 The position was originally established by the PAA ch 7 in 1998.  However, this chapter 
was later repealed and the provisions relevant to the Adult Guardian now appear in the GAA 
ch 8. 
83 GAA s 174. 
84 GAA s 174(2)(c). 
85 GAA s 42. 
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Adult Guardian may also be necessary if a guardian or attorney is behaving in 
a way that is inconsistent with the principles set out in the legislation. If a 
decision is being made (or not made) for an adult in a manner that is contrary 
to the health care principle, the Adult Guardian is entitled to intervene and 
exercise power for the health matter.86 These kinds of problems may also be 
resolved before the Tribunal, which is empowered to hear applications 
seeking a declaration, order, direction, recommendation or advice in relation 
to a matter involving an adult under the PAA and the GAA.87 
 
3.1.2 Criteria for decision making 
The legislation guides decision making for all kinds of medical treatment 
including decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures. The law 
treats decisions made in advance health directives (where the decision is 
made by the adult through this document) differently from decisions made by 
another person on behalf of the adult.  The latter category is referred to 
generically in this article as a ‘substituted decision maker’, regardless of 
whether the decision maker is someone close to the adult, the Adult Guardian 
or the Tribunal. The law that applies to these two different decision making 
streams will be considered separately. 
 
                                            
86 GAA s 43. 
87 GAA s 115. The Tribunal also has the specific power to consent to the withholding or 
withdrawal of a life-sustaining measure: GAA s 82(1)(f). 
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• Decision made by adult 
Advance health directives are legally binding documents and must be 
followed by health professionals who provide care to the adult.88  A failure to 
comply with a lawful request in a directive can result in both criminal and civil 
actions being brought against the relevant health provider for assault.89 There 
are, however, particular conditions that must be met before a direction to 
withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining measure can operate. 
 
The PAA provides that such a direction cannot operate unless two or three 
conditions are met, depending on the circumstances.90 The first condition is 
that the adult’s health must be sufficiently poor, and the legislation requires 
the adult to fall within one of four categories. The adult must: 
 
• have a terminal illness (or a condition that is incurable or irreversible) 
from which the adult is expected to die within a year; 
• be in a persistent vegetative state; 
• be permanently unconscious; or 
                                            
88 To be binding, an advance health directive must satisfy the formal requirements for 
completion as set out in the PAA: ch 3 pt 4.  An advance health directive under the 
Queensland legislation therefore does not include a common law advance directive.  See 
above n 71. 
89 The GAA creates an offence for health care to be provided contrary to the consent regime 
established by the legislation: s 79.  The civil consequences of providing health care contrary 
to an adult’s direction in an advanced health directive are not affected by the PAA or GAA.  
Note, however, the defences that are available under s 103 PAA to a health provider who 
does not comply with a direction in an advance health directive.  The appropriateness of 
these defences are considered in Ben White and Lindy Willmott Rethinking Life-Sustaining 
Measures: Questions for Queensland, above n 66, [45]-[47]. 
90 PAA s 36(2). 
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• have an illness or injury of such severity that there is no reasonable 
prospect that the adult will recover to an extent that life-sustaining 
measures will not be needed.91 
 
The second condition is that the advance health directive can only apply if the 
adult has no reasonable prospect of regaining the capacity needed to make 
decisions about his or her health.92 
 
The third condition applies only if the direction in an advance health directive 
is that the adult not receive artificial nutrition and hydration. In these 
circumstances, the directive will only operate if the commencement or 
continuation of this treatment would be inconsistent with good medical 
practice. 
 
If these two conditions (or three if it relates to artificial nutrition and hydration) 
are satisfied, the advance health directive is legally binding and must be 
followed. By contrast to when consent is given by another, there is no 
requirement to consider tests such as the best interests of the adult or 
whether the treatment is the option that is the least restrictive of his or her 
rights.93 The adult has made the decision for him- or herself through an 
advance health directive, and so the legislation imposes fewer limitations on 
the extent to which that decision to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining 
measure can operate. 
                                            
91 PAA s 36(2)(a). 
92 PAA s 36(2)(c). 
93 If consent is given by a substitute decision maker, regard must be had to the principles set 
out in the health care principle: PAA and GAA sch 1 Health Care Principle 12.  This and the 
General Principles are considered in more detail in the next section. 
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• Decision made by substitute decision maker 
The law is more complex if an advance health directive is not being relied 
upon, and instead consent is being given by a substitute decision maker.  The 
PAA and the GAA do provide guidance, however, for the people who are 
making these decisions on behalf of another. Schedule 1 in both Acts sets out 
a number of principles that must inform these sorts of decisions. They are 
separated into the ‘general principles’ and the ‘health care principle’. The 
general principles apply to all decisions made under the legislation, of which 
withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining measures is just one, and so are 
necessarily broad. The health care principle is to be used for health related 
decisions only, which obviously includes the sorts of decisions being 
discussed. 
 
The principles that are likely to be particularly relevant to a decision to 
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures include those that require 
consideration of: 
 
• the adult’s views and wishes, if they are known;94 
• whether the decision is ‘least restrictive of the adult’s rights’;95 
• what is in the adult’s best interests;96 and 
• the adult’s dignity.97 
 
                                            
94 PAA and GAA sch 1 General Principle 7. 
95 PAA and GAA sch 1 Health Care Principle 12(1)(a). 
96 PAA and GAA sch 1 Health Care Principle 12(1)(b)(ii). 
97 PAA and GAA sch 1 General Principle 3. 
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The decisions made, guided by these principles, will depend heavily on the 
circumstances of each case, and particularly on the condition of the patient. In 
a recent decision of the Guardianship and Administration Tribunal, Re MC,98 
the Tribunal referred to all of these principles but seemed to place 
considerable emphasis on the invasive nature of the treatment (or whether the 
treatment would be least restrictive of Mrs C’s rights), a consideration of what 
Mrs C would have wanted and what would be in Mrs C’s best interests.99 
 
Even if a substitute decision maker, after considering these principles and 
how they apply to the adult, decided to withhold or withdraw the life-sustaining 
measure, the legislation contains one further safeguard that must be 
considered before that decision can be made.  The consent to withhold or 
withdraw the life-sustaining measure given on behalf of the adult cannot 
operate unless the adult’s health provider reasonably considers that the 
commencement or continuation of the measure is inconsistent with good 
medical practice.100  ‘Good medical practice’ is defined in the legislation by 
reference to recognised medical standards, practices and procedures of the 
medical profession in Australia, as well as recognised ethical standards.101  In 
other words, the legislation prohibits the health provider from acting on a 
consent to withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining measure unless this 
threshold is satisfied. 
 
                                            
98 [2003] QGAAT 13. 
99 After considering these principles at length, and applying them to the facts of the case, the 
Tribunal consented to the withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration to Mrs C. 
100 GAA s 66A. 
101 PAA and GAA sch 2 s 5B. 
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3.1.3 Appeal avenues 
If a decision to withdraw or withhold a life-sustaining measure is made by a 
guardian or attorney, another ‘interested person’ may still apply to the Tribunal 
asking it to consider the matter.102  An ‘interested person’ is defined to mean a 
person who has a sufficient and continuing interest in the adult.103  Once the 
matter is before the Tribunal, it can assess the situation for itself and make an 
order in relation to whether the treatment should be withheld or withdrawn.104 
  
Appeal avenues also lie from a decision of the Tribunal.  A person can appeal 
to the Supreme Court against a Tribunal decision as of right if the appeal is on 
a matter of law.105  If the appeal is about a question of fact, then leave must 
first be obtained from the Supreme Court.106 
 
The usual appeal structure would apply in relation to decisions of the 
Supreme Court. 
 
3.2 SCHIAVO IN QUEENSLAND 
If a situation similar to that which arose in Terri Schiavo’s case occurred in 
Queensland, there are two potential legal pathways that might be relevant.  
As was mentioned earlier, one is to apply to the Supreme Court seeking 
                                            
102 GAA s 115. 
103 PAA sch 3, GAA sch 4.  The legislation confers on the Tribunal the power to decide who is 
an interested person: GAA s 126. 
104 GAA s 82(1)(f). 
105 GAA s 164.  Only an ‘eligible person’ as defined in s 164(3) can appeal against a Tribunal 
decision. 
106 GAA s 164(2). 
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resolution of the matter under its parens patriae jurisdiction.107 The other, 
which is considered in detail here, is the statutory regime established by the 
PAA and GAA. Under this regime, decisions about withholding and 
withdrawing life-sustaining measures are likely to be considered and resolved 
by the Tribunal. 
  
3.2.1 Who decides? 
Terri Schiavo had not filled in an advanced health directive, nor had she 
completed an enduring power of attorney appointing someone to act as her 
attorney to make health care decisions should she lose capacity.  In such a 
case, there are a number of ways in which a decision could be made on her 
behalf. 
 
Firstly, the person designated by the PAA to be Terri’s statutory health 
attorney will have the power to decide whether the artificial nutrition and 
hydration should be withdrawn.  The first choice on the list that is set out in 
the legislation is the spouse of the adult, provided that the relationship is close 
and continuing.  Michael Schiavo was Terri’s spouse, and the evidence 
produced at the various trials suggested that the relationship remained close 
and continuing.  Nevertheless, questions were raised about the state of their 
relationship given that he had a girlfriend with whom he had a child. If it were 
shown that the relationship was not close and continuing, then the next 
statutory health attorney on the list is a close friend or relative. This would 
include Terri’s parents. Ultimately then, the quality and type of relationship 
                                            
107 See, for example, State of Queensland v Nolan [2002] 1 Qd R 454 where the Supreme 
Court, in the exercise of its parens patriae jurisdiction, declared that an operation to separate 
conjoined twins to be lawful, even though it would result in the death of one of the twins.   
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that Michael and Terri had at the time that the health decision needed to be 
made would be critical to establishing who was the statutory health attorney.  
 
Although it is likely that Michael would have been the statutory health 
attorney, and so entitled to make the decision, the legislation provides some 
alternative avenues that could have been pursued by the Schindlers.  If the 
Schindlers believed that Michael was making a health care decision (namely 
the withdrawal of treatment) that was not in Terri’s best interests, they could 
notify the Adult Guardian.  The legislation confers a power on the Adult 
Guardian to exercise power for a health matter if he or she considers that the 
attorney (here, Michael) is making a decision that is contrary to the health 
care principle.108 
 
Alternatively, the Schindlers could choose to bring an application before the 
Tribunal.  If this matter were brought before the Tribunal, it would have a 
range of options open to it.  The Tribunal could appoint a guardian to make 
health decisions on behalf of Terri. If satisfied that an appointment was 
needed, the Tribunal could appoint the Schindlers, Michael or the Adult 
Guardian.109  Another option would be for the Tribunal to make the decision 
itself about whether to withhold or withdraw the artificial nutrition and 
                                            
108 GAA s 43.  Under Health Care Principle 12, a power should only be exercised if it is 
necessary and appropriate to maintain or promote the adult’s health or wellbeing, or if it is, in 
all the circumstances, in the adult’s best interests. 
109 GAA s 12.  However, such an appointment could only be made if there was a need for an 
appointment.  As Michael was already the statutory health attorney with the necessary 
powers to make decisions about health care, the Tribunal would need to be satisfied that, for 
some reason, it would be more appropriate for the Tribunal appointed guardian to make such 
decisions. 
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hydration.  There have been a number of decisions in which the Tribunal was 
called upon to make this kind of decision.110   
 
3.2.2 Criteria for Decision Making 
As required by Florida law, Michael Schiavo demonstrated that there was 
‘clear and convincing evidence’ that Terri would not have wanted her life to be 
artificially continued in her condition. The Florida court also found that Terri 
did not have a reasonable medical probability of recovering capacity, and that 
she was in a persistent vegetative state. Having met these conditions, the 
decision was made to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration. 
 
In Queensland, the legislation takes a different approach.  Whether the 
decision is made by a statutory health attorney, a guardian, the Adult 
Guardian or Tribunal, the legislation requires the decision maker to consider a 
range of principles.  The principles that may be relevant to a decision to 
withhold or withdraw a life-sustaining measure include the following. 
 
• Adult’s views and wishes, if they are known111 
In the Schiavo case, there was ‘clear and compelling’ evidence that Terri 
would not have wanted to be artificially kept alive in her condition.  
Although not determinative in Queensland, her views and wishes would be 
very persuasive in determining whether to withdraw her treatment.112 
 
                                            
110 Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13, Re TM [2002] QGAAT 1 and Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 2. 
111 PAA and GAA sch 1 General Principle 7(4) and Health Care Principle 12(2). 
112 In both Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13 and Re TM [2002] QGAAT 1, the views and wishes of 
the adult were considered by the Tribunal in deciding that treatment should be withheld or 
withdrawn. 
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• Adult’s best interests113 
What is in the ‘best interests’ of Terri would require a consideration of her 
current condition, the nature of the proposed treatment (for example, 
whether it is intrusive treatment) and the likelihood of that treatment 
improving her condition.  The medical evidence in the Schiavo case was 
that the PEG feeding was not providing any therapeutic benefit because it 
would not improve Terri’s medical condition.  Under the Queensland law, it 
is unlikely that the continuation of treatment would have been regarded as 
being in Terri’s best interests.114 
 
• Respect for adult’s human worth and dignity as an individual115 
In one of the cases where a decision was made to withhold artificial 
nutrition and hydration, the Tribunal accepted a submission of the Adult 
Guardian that the adult’s ‘human worth and dignity has been taken away 
by a futile medical intervention that is not allowing her to die naturally and 
is artificially prolonging the process.’116  The same observation could have 
been made in Terri’s case. 
 
• Least restrictive of the adult’s rights117 
In Queensland, the power for a health matter can only be exercised in a 
way that is least restrictive of an adult’s rights.  This means that if there is 
a choice between a more or less intrusive way of meeting a need of the 
                                            
113 PAA and GAA sch 1 Health Care Principle 12(1)(b)(ii). 
114 In Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13, for example, the medical evidence before the Tribunal was 
that the PEG tube was not providing any therapeutic benefit to the adult, so could not be 
regarded as being in the adult’s best interest. 
115 PAA and GAA sch 1 General Principle 3. 
116 Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13 at [67]. 
117 PAA and GAA sch 1 General Principle 7(3)(c) and Health Care Principle 12(1)(a). 
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adult, the less intrusive way must be chosen.  This principle has been 
considered relevant in decisions about withholding or withdrawing 
treatment.   In a case involving a 62 year old woman with severe dementia 
in the final stages of her disease and who had lost her swallowing reflex, 
the insertion of a PEG tube was held not to be the option least restrictive 
of her rights.118 When considering whether to perform an invasive medical 
procedure or not, given that the woman was in the terminal phase of her 
illness and was dying, the Tribunal considered that the least intrusive 
option was to not insert the PEG.119 
 
Terri’s situation was different.  She was not suffering from dementia, nor 
was she in the final stages of a progressive illness.  However, in line with 
how this principle has been interpreted to date, it would be open to the 
Tribunal to find that the ongoing provision of nutrition and hydration 
through a PEG tube was intrusive treatment that was restrictive of her 
rights. 
 
After considering each of these principles, it is quite likely that a decision 
maker would consent to the withdrawing of Terri Schiavo’s medical treatment. 
 
However, as discussed in the previous section of this article, because of the 
seriousness of a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining measures, 
the legislation has one further safeguard: a decision to withdraw such 
treatment cannot operate unless the adult’s doctor reasonably considers that 
                                            
118 Re TM [2002] QGAAT 1 at [164]-[165]. 
119 Ibid. 
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the commencement or continuation of the measure is inconsistent with good 
medical practice.  
 
In the Schiavo case, it is likely that this safeguard would have been satisfied.  
Although the Schindlers claimed that their daughter was responsive to stimuli, 
the consensus medical diagnosis was that Terri was in a persistent vegetative 
state and there was no available treatment that could improve her condition.  
Accordingly, a health provider would have been entitled to act on the consent 
given to withdraw Terri’s artificial nutrition and hydration. 
4 CONCLUSION 
This article examined the law that governs the withholding and withdrawal of 
life-sustaining medical treatment in both Florida and Queensland.  Both 
jurisdictions regulate who makes the decision, and how that decision is to be 
made.  
 
Although the legislation in each jurisdiction is quite different in a number of 
respects, there are some common threads that can be drawn.  Firstly, in both 
jurisdictions, it is likely that Michael Schiavo would have been charged with 
the responsibility to make decisions about Terri’s health care.  Further, in both 
Florida and Queensland, this decision can be made by another person or 
body such as a Court or Tribunal in appropriate circumstances.  This may be 
the case if, for example, Michael did not want the responsibility for the 
decision about treatment, or if the Schindlers alleged that Michael was making 
the decision on improper grounds. 
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Secondly, the statutes in both jurisdictions set out the criteria that govern how 
the decision should be made.  At the time of the Schiavo case, a decision to 
withdraw treatment could only be made if there was ‘clear and convincing 
evidence’ that this is what Terri would have wanted.  The legislation has since 
been amended so that such a decision can now also be made if it is regarded 
as being in her ‘best interests’.  In Queensland, the views and wishes of the 
adult, and the adult’s best interests are also relevant.  In addition, regard must 
be had to the adult’s dignity and whether the proposed treatment is the option 
least restrictive of the adult’s rights.  Although the language used in each 
jurisdiction is different, the same kinds of factors are relevant in assessing 
whether the respective criteria are satisfied. 
 
Thirdly, in addition to the above criteria, both Florida and Queensland have 
safeguards that mean that life-sustaining medical treatment cannot be 
withdrawn or withheld unless the adult is in sufficiently poor health.  In Florida, 
the adult must not have a reasonable medical probability of regaining 
capacity, and must either have an end-stage condition, be in a persistent 
vegetative state or have a terminal illness.  Although an equivalent provision 
does not exist in the Queensland legislation, a health provider must not 
withhold or withdraw treatment unless the provision of that treatment is 
inconsistent with good medical practice.  It is unlikely that this condition will be 
satisfied unless the adult is sufficiently ill. 
 
As we have seen in this article, the Schiavo case probably would have been 
decided in the same way in Queensland.  This is not surprising.  It is also 
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likely that the same outcome would have been reached in other common law 
countries.  There have been a series of cases around the world over the past 
decade that have considered when it is lawful to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining medical treatment.  The landmark English case is Airedale NHS 
Trust v Bland.120  Anthony Bland was seriously injured in the Hillsborough 
football ground disaster in 1989, which left him in a persistent vegetative 
state. The application to withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment was made 
by the hospital treating Anthony Bland, with the full support of his family, his 
doctor and independent physicians. The House of Lords held that it was lawful 
to discontinue certain life-sustaining medical treatment including artificial 
nutrition and hydration.  Since Bland, there have been a number of cases in 
which a court or tribunal has reached a similar conclusion.121 
 
There are obvious similarities in the Schiavo and Bland cases.  The bulk of 
the medical opinion was that the patients were in a persistent vegetative state 
and that there was no treatment available that could improve their condition.  
The crucial difference, however, was that in the Schiavo case the adult’s 
family was divided about the appropriate course of action.  If there had been 
agreement to either withdraw or continue with treatment, it is highly unlikely 
that the case would have captivated the world’s interest. 
 
                                            
120 [1993] AC 789. 
121 See, for example, Isaac Messiha (by his tutor Magdy Messiha) v South East Health [2004] 
NSWSC 1061, Re MC [2003] QGAAT 13, Re BWV; Ex parte Gardner (2003) 7 VR 487, Re 
TM [2002] QGAAT 1, Re RWG [2000] QGAAT 2, Re G [1997] 2 NZLR 201, Auckland Area 
Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235, In the Matter of a Ward of Court [1995] 
2 ILRM 401, and Law Hospital NHS Trust v Lord Advocate (1996) SLT 848. 
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The Schiavo case received an unprecedented amount of publicity.  The 
speculation about Terri Schiavo’s medical condition and her prognosis, the 
applications to court, the allegations and cross-allegations about the motives 
of the people involved, the various appeals made by the Schindlers and the 
views of religious and interest groups were reported in great detail in the 
United States and around the world.   
 
Yet from a legal perspective, the authors contend that the only controversial 
aspect of the Schiavo case was the legislative intervention by Florida’s 
Governor, Jeb Bush, and later by the United States Congress.  The decision 
by Justice Greer of the Guardianship Court in Florida to withdraw the artificial 
nutrition and hydration was legally uncontroversial.  The findings of the court 
were that Terri Schiavo was in a persistent vegetative state, had no prospect 
of recovery and had previously in her life expressed the view that she would 
not have wanted to be kept alive in that condition.  She had been sustained 
for 15 years through the provision of artificial nutrition and hydration.  The 
decision of Justice Greer was unremarkable from a legal perspective, and the 
same result would have been reached in other common law jurisdictions. 
 
